Should or should not forensic psychiatrists think about free will? by unknown
SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION
Should or should not forensic psychiatrists think about free will?
Gerben Meynen
Published online: 15 October 2008
 The Author(s) 2008. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The forensic psychiatrist’s task is often con-
sidered to be tightly connected to the concept of free will.
Yet, there is also a lack of clarity about the role of the
concept of free will in forensic psychiatry. Recently, Morse
has argued that forensic psychiatrists should not mention
free will in their reports or testimonies, and, moreover, that
they should not even think about free will. Starting from a
discussion on Morse’s claims, I will develop my own view
on how forensic psychiatrists are confronted with the issue
of free will and how they should deal with this concept and
the confusion surrounding it. I conclude that psychiatrists
should at least feel free to think about free will and that the
conceptual challenges connected to the issues of free will
and accountability could rather encourage than deter
forensic psychiatrists to think about them.
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Introduction
The forensic psychiatrist’s task is often considered to be
tightly connected to the concept of free will.1 Yet, there is
also a lack of clarity about the role of the concept of free
will in forensic psychiatry. Important issues are whether
free will is indeed a criterion for responsibility in forensic
matters, and, if free will is indeed a criterion, to which
extent forensic practitioners should be concerned with
philosophical considerations about free will, like the
problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism.2
Recently, Morse (2007) has made a gripping argument
which led him to conclude that it would be wise for
forensic psychiatrists not to mention free will in their
forensic reports or testimonies, and, moreover, that they
would not even think about free will.3 For free will would
not be a necessary concept in forensic matters, and on this
point Morse is supported by Felthous (2008).4 Using ‘free
will’ in forensic reports or deliberations would only lead to
confusion, according to Morse. Given the drastic measure
Morse arrives at—that forensic psychiatrists should com-
pletely avoid thinking about free will—it is important to
carefully examine his argument within the broader context
of forensic and philosophical debates on free will and
responsibility. Starting from a discussion on Morse’s line
of thought, I will develop my own view on how psychia-
trists should and should not deal with the lack of clarity
surrounding the issue of free will in forensic psychiatry.
I will distinguish two basic claims in Morse’s paper
relevant to the general discussion on free will and forensic
psychiatry. The first claim is about the ‘practical’5 issue
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1 See, e.g., Luthe and Ro¨sler (2004), Morse (2007), or Van Marle
(2000) in footnote 15 of this paper.
2 See, e.g., Felthous (2008), Morse (2007) and Wilson and Adshead
(2004).
3 Morse’s paper is about forensic psychiatrists and psychologists. In
this paper I will restrict my argument to (forensic) psychiatrists.
4 See also Buchanan (2008, p. 25): ‘‘Morse’s reassuring conclusion,
in the paper that Felthous (2008) cites, is that while there may be
questions about free will, it need not be a particular problem for
forensic psychiatrists. The criminal courts are often said to assume
that defendants have free will.’’
5 The practical issue is what I will later refer to as the ethical issue.
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that forensic assessments do not have to do with free will at
all. If this claim is correct, then forensic practitioners do
not have to worry about free will.6 The second claim
concerns the ‘metaphysical’ issue that moral responsibility
and determinism are compatible. Within the framework of
Morse’s paper this would mean that neither philosophers
nor anyone else—among whom psychiatrists—would have
to worry about the problem of free will. So, if both claims
can be proven to be right, then everyone, including the
forensic psychiatrist, can put his or her mind to rest, at least
as far as the problem of free will is concerned.
Both claims will be addressed in this paper. The issue at
stake is whether forensic psychiatrists should or should not
think about free will. Section ‘‘The practical argument: on
what is required for responsibility’’ is concerned with the
‘practical’ issue of forensic psychiatric assessment and free
will, and in Sect. ‘‘The metaphysical argument: on the
compatibility of free will and determinism’’ the ‘meta-
physical’ topic of the compatibility of free will or moral
responsibility and determinism is discussed. I argue that it
is important to clearly distinguish between the ethical issue
about what is needed for moral responsibility7 and the
metaphysical issue of the compatibility of freedom and
determinism. While the former is of direct relevance to the
forensic psychiatrist’s task, the latter is not. In Sect. ‘‘On
what (forensic) psychiatrists should and should not do and
think about’’, I will, based on this distinction, present my
position on what forensic psychiatrists should and should
not do or think about given current discussions—and
confusion—on free will and moral responsibility.
Although free will is central in this paper, I will not
define ‘free will’. Many people may have different intu-
itions on what it would take to have free will. According to
Walter (2001), three main aspects or components of free
will can be distinguished in the current philosophical
debate. The first component is, that to be free, one must be
able to do otherwise. Second, to be free means to act or
choose for an understandable reason. And, third, freedom
requires that one is the originator of one’s actions. The
current philosophical freedom debate is for a large part
concerned with the question to which extent these aspects
really are essential to the concept of free will, and if so, in
what way (Watson 2003; Frankfurt 2003; Kane 1998,
2002). In this paper I will not take a position on how to
understand free will, and I will not try to solve the con-
ceptual problems surrounding it. My point of departure is
that there is a widespread intuition in the literature—not
only among forensic psychiatrists but also among philoso-
phers—that if anything is important to moral responsibility,
it is free will. At the same time, free will is understood in
different ways (see also Sect. ‘‘The practical argument: on
what is required for responsibility’’), and that its exact
relation with moral responsibility is not clear. The paper
addresses the practical issue of how psychiatrists could
operate in their forensic work given the forensic task and
given the current philosophical debate on free will and the
conceptual complexities surrounding it.
The practical argument: on what is required
for responsibility
According to Morse (2007), there are several ways in
which forensic practitioners can be confused about free
will. He even distinguishes—‘‘tongue-in-cheek’’—a ‘‘Free
Will Confusion Syndrome’’. The Free Will Confusion
Syndrome has six features, and manifesting any one of the
signs or symptoms is sufficient to make the diagnosis. In
addition, the number of criteria manifested by a person
indicates the disorder’s severity (Morse 2007, p. 219). I
will not discuss each of the six features he describes, but I
will mention the three features that are central to his view.
These are, first, believing that psychiatry or psychology
have any data to contribute to whether a particular person
has free will. Second, believing that free will or its lack is a
legal criterion for responsibility and excuse. Third, using
‘‘free will’’ as a premise or conclusion in a forensic
argument. For example, ‘‘the defendant lacked free will
and was therefore legally insane’’ or ‘‘the defendant lacked
free will.’’8 And according to Morse (2007, p. 219),
‘‘many’’ forensic practitioners suffer from the syndrome,
that is ‘‘most generally marked by the erroneous belief that
free will is a specific or foundational criterion for respon-
sibility in morality and law.’’
As I understand Morse, examples of this confusion
would be Reich (2000, p. 206), who says that ‘‘the law
recognizes that insanity compromises free will, and clas-
sifies someone without free will as legally not responsible
for his or her actions (…)’’ and Luthe and Ro¨sler (2004,
p. 297) who state that in case the court consults psychiatric
experts, these experts ‘‘whether they want to or not, will
6 See also Felthous (2008, p. 21)
7 According to the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (entry
Moral Responsibility), ‘‘A comprehensive theory of moral responsi-
bility would,’’ among other things, ‘‘elucidate the conditions under
which the concept of moral responsibility is properly applied, i.e.,
those conditions under which a moral agent is responsible for a
particular something (e.g., a moral agent can be responsible for an
action she has performed only if she performed it freely, where acting
freely entails the ability to have done otherwise at the time of
action)’’.
8 The three other features of the ‘Free Will Confusion Syndrome’
are: Believing that science can solve the free will problem. Believing
or saying that causation excuses or mitigates responsibility. Believing




have to concern themselves with the question of whether
human actions can be freely chosen or whether the acting
person could not avoid acting as he did.’’9 Yet, according
to Morse, free will has nothing to do with the practice of
forensic assessments and forensic psychiatrists, therefore,
have nothing to do with the conceptual problems related to
free will: ‘‘The only practical free will problem is the
confusion among forensic practitioners and others who
think that free will is a problem or who speak and write as
if it is.’’10
Instead of free will, according to Morse, there are other
phenomena or criteria that should be addressed when
assessing whether a particular person is responsible for a
certain legally relevant act. In order to show what criterion
(instead of free will) is really important from a legal point
of view, Morse addresses ‘the legal view of a person’. The
legal view of a person is, he argues, that a person is a
rational being capable of letting himself be guided by rules:
The law’s view of the person is a creature capable of
practical reason, an agent who forms and acts on
intentions that are the product of the person’s desires
and beliefs. The law does not treat persons generally
as non-intentional creatures or mechanical forces of
nature. It could not be otherwise. Laws could not
guide people ex ante and ex post unless people were
the types of creature who could use laws as premises
in their practical reasoning (…). The law’s concept of
responsibility follows logically from the nature of law
itself and its concept of the person (…). Unless
human beings were rational creatures who could
understand the good reasons for action, including the
relevant facts and rules, and could conform to legal
requirements through intentional action, the law
would be powerless to affect human action. Legally
responsible agents are therefore people who have the
general capacity to grasp and be guided by good
reason in particular legal contexts.11
In Morse’s view, from this line of thought it follows that
rationality is the phenomenon that grasps the legal view of
a person.12 Although Morse does not refer to any specific
legal study or forensic document to substantiate this view,
at the end of the quote Morse refers to a study by R. Jay
Wallace (1994, p. 1). Wallace, a philosopher, developed an
argument concerning moral responsibility and he writes:
‘‘Being a responsible moral agent, I believe, is not really a
matter of having freedom of the will. Rather it primarily
involves a form of normative competence: the ability to
grasp and apply moral reasons, and to govern one’s
behavior by the light of such reasons.’’ While Morse refers
to Wallace to support his interpretation of legal responsi-
bility, it is in my view questionable whether the term
‘rationality’ completely captures what Wallace describes
here. For his point does not only seem to be about under-
standing and applying reasons, but also about being able to
guide or govern one’s behavior. In fact, Wallace’s final
conclusion is not that what is needed for moral responsi-
bility is rationality, but that ‘‘general powers of reflective
self-control’’ are required (see, e.g., 1994, p. 194). So, what
is important in Wallace’s account is also a notion of control
(of one’s behavior or oneself). And in my view such a
notion of control is also implicitly present in Morse’s ‘legal
view of a person’ as quoted above, since a person ‘‘could
conform to legal requirements through intentional action’’.
Why should not we overlook this element of control? In
current philosophical discussions on free will (and moral
responsibility) control is a central issue. The common view
is that freedom requires control. The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy (Entry Free will) reads: ‘‘Our survey of
several themes in philosophical accounts of free will sug-
gests that a—perhaps the—root issue is that of control.’’13
Kane (1999, p. 219) provides a good illustration of this
view: ‘‘We are often asked to consider, for example, that
whatever is undetermined or happens by chance is not
under the control of anything, and so is not under the
control of the agent. But an action that is not under the
control of the agent could not be a free and responsible
action.’’14 In addition, according to some philosophers,
control is not only a necessary but also a sufficient
9 See also by Luthe and Ro¨sler (2004, p. 296), ‘‘Modern criminal law
has (…) not fundamentally escaped the question of freedom (…).’’
10 Morse (2007, p. 204).
11 Morse (2007, p. 205, my emphasis on ‘rational’).
12 Morse (1999) goes in more detail on his view on rationality in
forensic matters. I will, however, focus on Morse’s 2007 argument
about how psychiatrists should deal with ‘free will’. Felthous (2008,
p. 21) seems to side with Morse in an important respect. He considers
Morse to have made ‘‘a strong argument that the concept of a
metaphysically free will is unnecessary for sustaining the purposes of
the legal system in the United States.’’ Meanwhile, according to
Wilson and Adshead (2004, p. 301), ‘‘[w]e have a powerful sense of
our own ability to freely choose our behavior, and this is the common-
Footnote 12 continued
sense view of the law.’’ Cf. Eastman (1992, p. 161): ‘‘Considering
only criminal law, the heart of the definition of most crimes (actus
reus plus mens rea) incorporates the requirement of (varying degrees
of) intention, that is, it invents intentional man. It implies a model of
human behaviour which is clearly exclusively cognitive in nature,
unitary (in relation to each defined crime), and based on a presump-
tion of free will rather than (scientific) determinism.’’
13 See about control in relation to free will and moral responsibility
(and the possibility of a deterministic world), also Fischer 1994 and,
together with Ravizza 1998. Mele (2004, p. 78) also discusses, based
on Elliot’s (1996) study about The Rules of Insanity. Moral
Responsibility and The Mentally Ill Offender, control in relation to
mental disorders. See also Felthous (2008, pp. 21–22) on control.
14 This quote already shows something that will be explicitly
discussed further in the paper: that in the current philosophical
debate matters of freedom and responsibility are intertwined.
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condition for freedom. As Benson (1987, p. 477) puts it: ‘‘It
is true that most writers have assumed as a matter of course
that freedom consists in nothing more than control.’’
Benson (1987, p. 485) even observes a ‘‘dogmatic con-
viction that freedom simply cannot consist in anything
more than control or ability to do otherwise.’’ So, while
Morse does not mention freedom or free will in ‘the legal
view of a person’ this does not mean that the notion of ‘free
will’ is eliminated in his account.
Morse seems to intend to show that one can deliver an
account on the legal view of a person without mentioning
‘free will’, and Felthous (2008) agrees with Morse that the
United States law does not mention free will.15 Yet,
although it is good and refreshing to look at the exact
phrasings in the legal documents, we should realize that the
(philosophical) question at stake could still be somewhat
different. It could be about whether the concept of free will
is implicitly present, or whether it can even be considered
guiding the law in some relevant or even vital way. To
drive the point home, even if we consider a certain con-
cept—let us say rationality or control—vital to grasp the
legal notion of a responsible person, then, still, one would
have to show how exactly it relates to the concept of free
will. Not mentioning free will does not at all guarantee that
(a certain notion of) free will is not implied.
As a further illustration, let us return to Wallace. He
indeed states that free will is not needed for moral
responsibility. Yet, what he in fact means to say is, as he
puts it in Pre´cis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments
(2002, p. 680): ‘‘[T]he general powers for moral reasoning
and response that make us accountable, on my theory, do
not involve or presuppose the kinds of alternative possi-
bilities for action traditionally associated with freedom of
will.’’ This means that Wallace’s point is in the end not that
free will as such is not necessary for moral behavior, but
that alternative possibilities (one of the aspects of free will
that is being debated in the philosophical discussions, see
Walter 2001) are unnecessary. And it is important to note
that dropping the feature of alternative possibilities does
not eliminate ‘free will’ from the discussion. Also Frank-
furt (2003, p. 344), who provided an influential16 argument
to show that moral responsibility does not require alter-
native possibilities, still uses the term ‘free will’, e.g., as he
says that blaming a person may be reasonable ‘‘when the
person has performed the action in question (…) entirely
for reasons of his own and thus of his own free will.’’
So, while Morse emphasizes that relevant legal docu-
ments do not mention free will as a requirement for
accountability, this does not provide us with a conclusive
argument that free will just does not have to do with the
practice of assessing moral or legal responsibility. To
exemplify this point I showed that from the ‘legal view of a
person’, as presented by Morse, it does not follow that what
is required is only ‘rationality’.17 Control might be
involved as well, and this concept is considered to be
closely linked to—or, apparently, sometimes even identical
with—the concept of free will.
In fact, what we have been discussing here, is what I
consider the ‘ethical’ problem concerning free will, namely
the question: What is required for responsibility? Morse
answers this question by interpreting ‘the legal view of a
person’ as being essentially about rationality.18 He relies
strongly on the exact phrasing in legal documents, and I
have tried to show that even if one would follow his view
of a legal view of a person, it is not clear that this means
that the concept of free will no longer applies. The basic
idea I wanted to convey is that not mentioning free will
does not mean that the concept of free will has been cut out
or has become irrelevant.
Felthous’s (2008) paper on forensic psychiatry and free
will is in important respects supportive of Morse’s view
(see also Buchanan 2008). Felthous proposes to leave out
the ‘free’ part of free will. According to Felthous (2008, p.
21), ‘‘[t]he law defines mental responsibility and compe-
tence by the presence or absence of certain capacities or
functional abilities or by the specific actual, active func-
tions such as specific intent and deliberation (…). ‘‘Free’’
will is not involved.’’ While proposing to drop the ‘free’
15 In general, there are different juridical systems in different
countries, and the exact task or description of the task of a forensic
psychiatrist may differ. See, e.g., on English law and Anglo-American
jurisdictions Wilson and Adshead (2004, pp. 298, 303), Green et al.
(1991), and see Van Marle (2000), on forensic assessments in the
Netherlands: ‘‘Undiminished responsibility means that the person
concerned had complete access to his or her free will at the time of the
crime with which he or she is charged and could therefore have
chosen not to do it. Irresponsibility means that the person concerned
had no free will at all with which to choose at the time of the crime
with which he or she is charged. Important here is determining the
moment when aspects of the disorder become manifest in the situation
(‘‘the scene of the crime’’) that will eventually lead to the
perpetration. The earlier they play a role, the more inevitable will
be the (disastrous) sequence of events, and the stronger will be the
eventual limitation of free will.’’ Yet, in my view, the issue at stake—
the issue of forensic psychiatry and matters of free will and moral
responsibility—transcends national legal borders and specific national
phrasings of the task of forensic psychiatrists.
16 See Ginet (2003, p. 76).
17 Surely, the law does not seem to be written from the perspective
that a person is in principle irrational, and it is safe to say that
‘rationality’ is important to legal responsibility, but what I have tried
to show is that from this it does not follow that rationality is sufficient
for moral or legal responsibility. For it is not about which concepts
are relevant to responsibility, it is about the question whether we are
in a position to consider rationality the preeminent requirement for
moral responsibility—independent of the notion of free will.
18 Importantly, as Felthous (2008, p. 23) points out: ‘‘However,
rationality, too, is subject to diverse definitions.’’ Yet, I will not
further discuss the issue of rationality in forensic assessment.
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part of free will, he argues that the will deserves (more)
attention in forensic psychiatry. According to Felthous
(2008, p. 23), ‘‘[t]he will is simply the intentional faculty:
Through motivation and decision the will settles upon and
then implements an action.’’ This could be true, but for
moral responsibility it might just not be enough that
something was ‘willed’, or that a motivated decision was
made.19
Although, as indicated, I will not try to define free will,
it could be helpful to pay some attention to Felthous’s
proposal. When he says that ‘‘[t]he will is simply the
intentional faculty: Through motivation and decision the
will settles upon and then implements an action,’’ one
should ask oneself whether this provides sufficient infor-
mation to distinguish, with respect to accountability, e.g., a
legally relevant act performed due to a paranoid delusion
from a legally relevant act performed without any mental
disorder. Both actions may be motivated, intentional, and
both may involve a decision. In order to be able to dis-
tinguish between these two cases, therefore, a forensic
psychiatrist might want to qualify the motivational and
decisional process, and try to examine, e.g., how the
intention, motivation, and decision ‘came about’. To put it
cautiously, some people might start to use the word ‘free’
here, exactly at the point where the forensic psychiatrist
has to make his or her assessment. I am not trying to say
that Felthous’ s proposal should not be pursued, but that it
is important to see whether and how our intuitions on moral
responsibility with respect to the forensic task can be fully
grasped and articulated when only using the concept of
‘will’.
To conclude this section, although the concept of free
will and its relation to moral responsibility may be com-
plicated, I do not think that it is justified to infer, based on
the arguments presented, that forensic practice as such just
does not have to do with free will. In order to get a clearer
view on Morse’s line of thought that leads him to the far-
reaching measure that forensic psychiatrists should avoid
thinking about free will, and to further develop my own
view on the issue of free will and forensic psychiatry, I will
now turn to Morse’s ‘metaphysical’ argument.
The metaphysical argument: on the compatibility
of free will and determinism
There is an additional problem related to the concept of
free will: the notorious question about the compatibility of
free will and determinism. Some people are also worried
about this problem within the context of the forensic
psychiatrist’s task.20 They reason, briefly, that if we live in
a deterministic world, and if free will is incompatibile with
determinism, free will must be an illusion. Then, if the
forensic psychiatrists’ task is about free will, this task must
be illusory in itself.
Morse also pays attention to this topic. It might even be
a little surprising that he develops an argument on this what
I call the ‘metaphysical’ issue of the compatibility of free
will and determinism. For if forensic psychiatry has noth-
ing to do with the concept of free will, as he claims, why
bother about the compatibility of free will and determin-
ism, or the metaphysical positions on free will, moral
responsibility and determinism? Yet Morse (2007, p. 212)
addresses this issue because people, ‘‘including judges,
practicing lawyers and a few law professors, talk as if free
will were important in criminal law, but this is clearly
wrong as a matter of positive law. They sometimes mean
(…) that free will is a necessary foundational justification
for responsibility, even if it is not a criterion in any legal
doctrine.’’ He argues that such a concern about conceptual
problems surrounding free will is needless, for there is an
‘‘entirely plausible and practical’’ resolution of the meta-
physical problem. But can we, indeed, consider this
problem resolved?
The three main philosophical positions on free will and
determinism are: libertarianism, hard determinism and
compatibilism. I will introduce these three positions in this
section, and discuss Morse’s view on them. ‘Libertarians’
and ‘hard determinists’ may disagree on almost everything,
but they agree that free will and determinism are incom-
patible. Libertarians deem free will true, and, therefore,
determinism false. According to Morse (2007, p. 212),
‘‘Free will is usually taken to mean, explicitly by philos-
ophers and implicitly by others, that the agent has the
ability to cause his or her own behavior uncaused by
anything else. In a phrase, the buck stops entirely with the
agent.’’ In order to introduce the libertarian position, Morse
emphasizes here what can be considered the third element
of Walter’s (2001) tripartite view on free will: being the
source of one’s behavior (see also Kane 1998). And he
adds that ‘‘[o]nly a small number of philosophers adhere to
this view, which has been termed a ‘‘panicky’’ meta-
physics because it is so implausible.’’ Morse refers in a
footnote to the philosopher Bok (1998), who indeed con-
siders the libertarian position ‘implausible’. Still, the idea
that libertarianism is ‘implausible’, as Morse puts it, is not
generally agreed on in the metaphysical discussion; it is
simply a position in the debate. And the ‘implausibility’ of
libertarianism, therefore, cannot be considered a sort of
19 On the difference between ‘will’ and ‘free will’, also see Sebanz
and Prinz (2006, pp. 3–5).
20 See for example Wilson and Adshead (2004, p. 301) on ‘‘the
confusing issues of free will and determinism’’ with respect to
forensic assessments.
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‘fact’ (see, e.g., Kane 1998). Bok (and Morse) may, in
principle, turn out to be right, but it is not yet ‘decided’.
With respect to the connection between the libertarian view
and the law, Morse says that many people believe that
libertarianism is ‘‘a foundational assumption for law’’.21
He, however, will later argue that a libertarian notion of
free will is not necessary to save moral and legal
responsibility.
Hard determinists hold that determinism is true and that,
therefore, free will is false.22 The major problem for hard
determinists is to explain our moral intuitions and to
explain how we should deal with them after we have
realized that free will is ‘illusory’. Morse understands the
hard determinist position primarily as a position about the
incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. If
the hard determinists are right, then ‘‘forensic psychiatrists,
forensic psychologists, and everyone else have a massive
and genuine free will problem because all mental health
laws depend on the non-responsibility assumption, which
in turn assumes that most people are responsible, that
responsibility is the default condition’’ (Morse 2007,
p. 214). So, while Morse has tried to show in the previous
section that legal responsibility does not have to do with
the issue of free will, he says here that there would be a
‘massive and genuine free will problem’ for legal practices
in case hard determinism is true.23 If Morse is right in this
view on hard determinism, then, as long as the truth of hard
determinism is on the cards, there seems to be something to
worry about for forensic practitioners.
Compatibilism is, in principle, just the view that free
will and determinism can get along perfectly well. Yet,
compatibilists usually have some slightly other view of free
will than the (‘incompatible’) libertarian view; they gen-
erally do not demand from free will what libertarians
demand from it. They are satisfied with some softer con-
ception of free will, but they consider this conception still
worthy to be called ‘free will’. Morse turns out to be a kind
of compatibilist and he argues (2007, p. 216) that ‘‘even if
determinism is true, forensic psychiatry and psychology
have no practical free will problem because the doctrines of
responsibility are entirely consistent with the truth of
determinism or because responsibility is impossible tout
court.’’ A libertarian conception of free will—being the
source of one’s actions ‘‘is not necessary to underwrite our
positive conceptions of responsibility.’’ And Morse (2007,
p. 216) concludes that ‘‘[b]ecause compatibilism is con-
sistent with our responsibility practices and their centrality
and because there is no convincing theoretical reason to
reject it, all participants in the legal system, including
forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, have good reason
to embrace compatibilism. Forensic practitioners can
comfortably continue to play a crucial role in helping legal
decision makers assess responsibility in all civil and
criminal law contexts without being distracted by the
irrelevant issue of free will.’’ As it seems, the fact that
forensic practitioners can comfortably continue to play a
crucial role in helping judges by assessing responsibility
relies in the end on the fact that determinism is compatible
with moral responsibility.
We have to note that Morse considers compatibilism to
be a thesis about the compatibility of determinism and
moral responsibility. Yet, usually compatibilism is first of
all considered to be a thesis about determinism and free
will.24 Importantly, from embracing compatibilism it does
not at all follow that there would no longer be an issue of
free will related to moral responsibility. In fact, compa-
tibilists can very well consider free will (in some ‘softer’
form) necessary for moral responsibility. Compatibilists
might even want to argue for compatibility exactly because
they do consider free will necessary for moral responsi-
bility. In general, one of the important reasons—if not the
reason—why free will is so central in philosophy is exactly
the supposed importance to responsibility, as Van Inwagen
(1986, p. 153) puts it: ‘‘[W]e care about free will because
we care about moral responsibility, and we are persuaded
that we cannot make ascriptions of moral responsibility to
agents who lack free will.’’25 So, from this perspective, the
metaphysical worries about the compatibility of free will
and determinism are fuelled by the ethical intuition that
free will is required for moral responsibility.
Importantly, compatibility problems do not only arise as
long as we use the concept of free will. For the compati-
bility question can, as we saw, also be expressed in terms
of the compatibility between determinism and moral
responsibility or legal accountability, without referring to
(a specific notion of) free will. So, ignoring or avoiding the
concept of free will, will as such not free us from a
metaphysical compatibility problem.
21 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Entry Moral responsibility):
‘‘For example, some have argued that while a compatibilist sense of
freedom is necessary for attributability, genuine accountability would
require that agents be capable of exercising libertarian freedom.’’
22 Morse (2007) refers to hard determinists as ‘incompatibilists’.
23 See also Kawohl and Habermeyer (2007, p. 309): ‘‘The free will
debate widely exceeds the neuroscientific and philosophical fields due
to profound implications for legislation, case law and psychiatric
expert opinion.’’
24 According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘‘Compat-
ibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.
Because free will is taken to be a necessary condition of moral
responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed in terms of a
compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.’’ (http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism).
25 This does surely not mean that (the nature of) the relationship
between free will and moral responsibility is clear. See also, e.g.,
Nagel (2003) and P.F. Strawson (2003, pp. 72–73).
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Now, in my opinion it is helpful to forensic psychiatry to
make a distinction between these two topics: on the one
hand the ethical issue concerning the question what is
needed for responsibility and on the other hand the meta-
physical worries about the compatibility of free will and
determinism. These issues are separable, and although
forensic psychiatrists are not asked to make judgments
about the compatibility question, they are asked to make an
assessment with respect to what is needed for responsibility.
Morse seems to be convinced that even if determinism is
true, moral responsibility can be saved. Meanwhile he says
that, indeed, there is no definite solution to the compati-
bility problem: ‘‘There are no decisive, analytically
incontrovertible arguments to resolve the metaphysical
question of the relation between determinism, libertarian
free will and responsibility’’ (2007, p. 213). Morse’s
dealing with the metaphysical problem is interesting and
provocative, yet it is not conclusive. This means that the
metaphysical free will problem can be considered intact.
For instance, with respect to this problem the philosopher
Searle (2007, p. 11) remarks:
The problem of free will is unusual among contem-
porary philosophical issues in that we are nowhere
remotely near having a solution. I can give you a
pretty good account of consciousness, intentionality,
speech acts and of the ontology of society, but I do
not know how to solve the problem of free will.
To summarize, Morse argued that forensic concerns about
the problem of free will are needless, for there would be an
entirely plausible and practical resolution of the metaphys-
ical free will problem. He then tried to show that the
compatibility question can be considered resolved. Yet, in
my opinion, given the fact that the metaphysical compati-
bility question cannot be considered resolved, Morse
would—within the framework of his project—leave the door
open to the compatibility question in forensic psychiatry.
As a matter of fact, I think that there is no need to try to
resolve the compatibility question in order to free forensic
psychiatrists from this metaphysical enigma. For the
important step to be taken is to disentangle the ethical and
metaphysical issue and to say that, yes, forensic psychiatrists
have to do with the ethical debate on what is required for
moral responsibility—and in this debate free will is a central
issue—and that, no, forensic practitioners do not have to
address the compatibility question. There are many (or rather
endless) philosophical issues, and only some of them will be
directly relevant to forensic practice. Yet, the question
‘‘What is needed in order to be held responsible?’’ is relevant
to forensic psychiatry, I argue. And it is my claim that if the
discussions on this matter involve the concept free will,
which is the case, then psychiatrists should not keep aloof
from this concept just to avoid to get into (compatibility)
trouble.26 The practical consequence of taking the distinc-
tion between the ethical and metaphysical issue seriously and
acknowledging that free will plays a role in the discussions
on moral responsibility, is that forensic practitioners do not
have to stop thinking about free will.
Analogous to Morse, while discussing his analysis, in
this section I have tried to provide my view on the bearings
of the philosophical debate for the practice of forensic
psychiatry. I value the metaphysical debate differently:
while Morse emphasizes the implausibility of libertarian-
ism, the plausibility of compatibilism, and the enormous
consequences of hard determinism to legal practices, I
emphasize the inconclusiveness of the metaphysical debate
on the compatibility question, and the fact that this meta-
physical topic can and should be distinguished from the
practically relevant ethical question about what is needed
for moral responsibility. In my view, forensic psychiatrists
cannot distance themselves from what I call the ethical
question—because forensic assessment is exactly about
what is needed for responsibility—while they can distance
themselves from the compatibility question.
On what (forensic) psychiatrists should and should
not do and think about
Let us now look more closely at the question what forensic
psychiatrist should and should not think about. Certainly,
there is no need for individual psychiatrists trying to make
philosophical arguments on what is required for moral
responsibility while reporting on a particular forensic case.
But I would like to add that there is also no need for
individual psychiatrists unraveling the sociological or
neurobiological factors relevant to delinquent behavior
while reporting on a particular forensic case. Yet, from this
it does not follow that psychiatrists as professionals should
not study such factors in scientific research. Clearly, also a
doctor or psychiatrist should not wait until he has solved
the conceptual problems concerning the concept of ‘dis-
ease’ or ‘mental disorder’ before treating a patient, but this
does not mean that doctors should not think about the
concept of disease, or that the medical profession should
not pay careful attention to the way the concept of disease
or mental disorder can be understood. In fact, the con-
ceptual issues might be best addressed in scientific research
26 Meanwhile, the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926,
well-known for his view on schizophrenia, ‘dementia praecox’ in his
words) seems, at least in a way, to support Morse and Felthous:
‘‘Kraepelin did not want to engage himself in the philosophical debate
about determinism. Instead, his aim was to reject all ‘‘metaphysical’’
implications in (forensic) psychiatry, like the idea of an apriorical free
will and to emphasize the naturalistic quality of all social and
psychological phenomena’’ (Hoff 1998, p. 351).
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projects, in which, preferably, philosophers and forensic
practitioners (and lawyers) could cooperate.
So, I would propose not only to distinguish between the
ethical and metaphysical issue, but also to distinguish
between the individual psychiatrist making an assessment,
and the professional community of forensic practitioners
having to deal with certain conceptual challenges. The
professional community has, in my view, a broader and
deeper responsibility for conceptual issues within its
domain than the individual practitioner, and interdisci-
plinary research might be a good way to address them.
Individual forensic professionals, in turn, might be helped
by such research in obtaining better conceptual tools that
improve the quality of their judgment.
In any case, it would be strange that while the concepts of
free will and moral responsibility are so intimately related,
psychiatrists have to think about one of these while avoiding
the other completely. In addition, concepts are related to
other concepts and forensic psychiatrists should be free to go
in their conceptual framework. How psychiatrists should
phrase their forensic reports, is yet another issue. And,
surely, forensic assessment might be helped by or even
require the ‘operationalization’ of certain complicated con-
cepts, for instance moral responsibility.27 Factors like
memory, consciousness and rationality28 could be important
to forensic assessments and testimonies. But their impor-
tance would not mean that free will is no longer relevant; in
fact, these factors might even be considered operational-
izations of what it is like to be a ‘free and responsible agent’.
How could forensic practitioners in a particular case
benefit from thinking about free will? Well, maybe psy-
chiatrists who are to assess whether a mental disorder has
in a legally relevant way to do with some person’s action,
could use some counterpoint in their deliberations. They
might be helped by having at least some idea about what it
is like if no disorder is involved in a person’s behavior.
Some, or many, might call this a state of freedom or free
will. It might be helpful to a psychiatrist, weighing all the
information, to consider whether the state in which the
person was, resembles this ‘free’ state, or whether there is
some essential divergence from this ‘free’ state. The state
of freedom is in this case a counterpoint in the deliberation.
Free will would be some ‘guiding’ idea. This might not be
wrong at all, even not in a particular forensic case. Or, put
more cautiously, I do not think that Morse has shown it to
be wrong. Then, what would be the practical consequence
if his proposal would be put to practice? Forensic
psychiatrists would alienate themselves from the general
debate on moral responsibility and from a key intuition—
which, surely, does not necessarily mean it is right—on
moral responsibility. Trying to avoid this discussion and
this key intuition could hamper their assessment, which is
exactly about assessing responsibility. There may be
compelling arguments to avoid major debates and key
intuitions, but I do not think they are provided in this case.
There is a more general issue, still. Indeed, conceptual
confusion about free will and its relation to moral responsi-
bility does exist. Yet, we should consider that if psychiatrists
would have to stop thinking at points at which their profes-
sion touches upon conceptually problematic issues,
psychiatrists could be ending up avoiding many concepts.
For the domain of psychiatry seems for a considerable part at
least potentially conceptually confusing.29 For instance, the
very concept of ‘mental disorder’ is in relevant respects
complicated (see, e.g., Sadler 2005; Bolton 2008). I think
that psychiatrists should, given the conceptual complexity of
their profession, not be encouraged to stop thinking about
such issues, but rather, as a profession, be encouraged to deal
with them. It is important, however, to see exactly which
problems are relevant to the practical task.
While I argue that the compatibility question is not
(directly) relevant to forensic work, my argument is not
meant to bring forward that ‘metaphysical’ issues per se are
detached from the practice of psychiatry. Philosophy should
not be primarily considered as ‘detached’ from forensic
issues,30 but, in part, as the practice of dealing with the
conceptual problems psychiatrists face, e.g., the problem of
free will and accountability. And, perhaps not surprisingly,
philosophers refer to psychiatry in their papers on moral
responsibility and free will.31 Apparently, they consider
27 See also Wilson and Adshead (2004, p. 296): ‘‘What ‘‘criminal
responsibility’’ might mean and how it might be measured has caused
a good deal of discussion among psychiatrists, philosophers, and
lawyers. There is general agreement that the term is problematic.
There is not general agreement on the source of the problem.’’
28 Morse (2007), see also Felthous (2008).
29 Cf. Sadler (2005) and Fulford et al. (2006).
30 As Morse (2007, p. 220) seems to suggest: ‘‘If one has a taste for
deep philosophical problems, free will is of course worth thinking
about. The issue is an endlessly interesting evergreen that will never
be solved to everyone’s satisfaction. But if one thinks about the
problem in this sense, one is doing philosophy, not forensic work.’’
31 For instance, in one of the most influential philosophical papers on
freedom and moral responsibility, Freedom and Resentment, P.F.
Strawson (2003, p. 73) explains a compatibilist position in the
following way: ‘‘(…) what ‘freedom’ means here is nothing but the
absence of certain conditions the presence of which would make
moral condemnation or punishment inappropriate. They [compatib-
ilists] have in mind conditions like compulsion by another, or innate
incapacity, or insanity, or other less extreme forms of psychological
disorder (…).’’ See also Galen Strawson (2003, p. 222): ‘‘Compatib-
ilists believe that one can be a free and morally responsible agent
even if determinism is true. Roughly, they claim, with many
variations of detail, that one may correctly be said to be truly
responsible for what one does, when one acts, just so long as one is
not caused to act by any of a certain set of constraints (kleptomanic
impulses, obsessional neuroses, desires that are experienced as alien,




mental disorders relevant to their arguments. Therefore, they
too might be interested in cooperative research on moral
responsibility and mental disorder. In my view, psychiatrists
should invite philosophers to direct their attention to their
problems, and try to link philosophical to psychiatric
expertise.
In conclusion, there are different views on how to
understand and define free will. Some understand free will
as doing things for reasons, or as being the source of one’s
actions, others understand free will in terms of alternative
possibilities, or in terms of control. Whatever the exact
view on free will, there is a widespread intuition—among,
e.g., forensic psychiatrists and philosophers—that it is first
of all free will that is required for moral responsibility.
Given the psychiatrists task, it would be strange and arti-
ficial when psychiatrists would have to assess
responsibility or accountability while avoiding thinking
about free will. Still, not all issues related to free will are
relevant to forensic work; the compatibility question can
and should be distinguished from the ethical issue of what
is required for moral responsibility. The conceptual chal-
lenges connected to this ethical issue are directly related to
the forensic task and they should encourage rather than
deter psychiatrists to think about them within the context of
interdisciplinary (psychiatrists, philosophers and lawyers)
research. In this way the clarity—and therefore quality—of
forensic assessments could be improved.
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